Warren J stirs the Witches’ brew of notices of intention and the validity of administration appointments (case of Msaada Group)

January 10th, 2012 by Mike Pavitt

On 29 December we reported that Norris J appeared to be starting the process of laying to rest the various legal issues to do with the validity of out of court administration appointments, which had so energised the profession in 2011. The case was Virtualpurple Professional Services, decided on 21 December (click here for our previous blogpost and details of the pivotal Minmar decision which created all this interest).

Little did we know at the time of writing that blog that we would subsequently receive a report of another judgment being handed down by another Judge in the very same Court on the very same day. We think it would be fair to say that the two Judges in question do not see entirely eye to eye on what for convenient shorthand we will call ‘the Minmar issue’ of what notices are required as a precondition for a valid appointment where there is no qualifying floating chargeholder, although on one view they could both be said to be pursuing the same aim of restoring certainty to this difficult area.

The second case was that of National Westminster Bank Plc v Msaada Group [2011] EWHC 3423 (Ch), involving a purported partnership administration appointment in the care homes industry being challenged by the bank inter alia because no prior notice was given to the supervisor of the pre-existing partnership voluntary arrangement. We had to review the judgment on a Sunday afternoon with a wet towel around our heads so we would certainly not recommend it for those seeking a clear exposition of the proper interpretation of paragraphs 26 and 28 Schedule B1 Insolvency Act 1986 or IR 2.20 but we will say this for Warren J’s examination; it is certainly thorough. Whereas some aspects of the Chancellor’s analysis in Minmar could perhaps fairly be criticised for lacking reference to prior authority and/or clarity as to whether issues discussed were obiter or part of the decision, no such criticism could apply to Warren J, who was clearly seeking to set out a very firmly founded proposition, including precisely why he was departing from the reasoning of HH Judge McCahill QC in the pre-Minmar decision of Hill v Stokes [2010] EWHC 3726 (Ch).

At the conclusion of a 100 paragraph judgment, Warren J ordered that the partnership’s purported out of court administration appointment was invalid for want of notice, rejected (on the facts) an Adjei v Law for All style application for a retrospective administration order for the partnership’s purported appointee and granted the bank’s application for the appointment of its own nominee.

What can most readily be taken from the judgment is the conclusion that the requirements of paragraph 26(2) and IR 2.20(1) are prescriptive and accordingly that a relevant enforcement officer, person distraining, any  Supervisor and the company itself must be given reasonable notice of intention to appoint. The form and content of that notice is to be regarded as the same as for a qualifying floating chargeholder (had there been one), and reasonable notice would be constituted by giving notice in like manner (i.e. at least 5 days although the relevant parties may validly consent to short notice). When challenged by Counsel for the partners, the Judge said that in cases of absolute urgency, the appointors could make an application to Court for an administration order rather than relying on the out of court route.

For more information on this topic, please contact Mike Pavitt.

Invalidity of Administrators’ appointments – administrators win latest round before the courts

December 29th, 2011 by Mike Pavitt

Office holders and others with an interest in the seemingly endless run of cases about the invalidity of office holders’ appointments may wish to review the decision of Norris J, handed down on 21 December 2011 in the case of Virtualpurple Professional Services ltd [2011] EWHC 3487 (Ch)

The most important aspect of this judgment would appear to be the finding that, at least where directors are otherwise in a position to effect an immediate administration appointment (there being no qualifying floating charge holder to give notice to), it is NOT in fact necessary to give notice of the appointment to the company itself.  In order to apply this authority more generally it is necessary to look at the facts carefully, but at first blush this conclusion does appear to reach the opposite conclusion to that drawn (albeit on an obiter and therefore non-binding footing) by the Chancellor in his controversial judgment (from para 53) in the case of Minmar (929) Ltd handed down in April 2011.

As we head into the New Year, the debates about the validity of administration appointments and the extent to which they may be retrospectively validated will doubtless continue to rage but this decision hopefully marks the beginning of some of the Minmar questions being laid to rest by the courts.  It is likely that 2012 will see a good many administration appointments and for the insolvency profession to perform its task to the best of its ability for the benefit of the creditors, certainly is required.  For now, though, caution remains the order of the day whilst office holders’ attention perhaps begins to shift towards the debate over whether the government will get its own way in rationalising the list of accredited regulators for insolvency practitioners.

For more information on administration appointments please contact our lead insolvency partner Mike Pavitt at mike.pavitt@parissmith.co.uk

Wind farm noise nuisance claim settles – Davis v Tinsley

December 19th, 2011 by Jennifer Roberts

A recent out-of-court settlement in relation to disturbance caused to a couple living near a noisy wind farm suggests that there may be scope for taking action against wind farm operators or indeed other similarly intrusive facilities.

Mr & Mrs Davis brought proceedings against the landowners and operators of wind turbines seeking either an injunction to close them down/limit the hours of operation of the turbines closest to their home or, alternatively, damages of up to £2.5 million as compensation for the disruption. They claimed that the excessive noise had forced them out of their home and into rented accommodation.

A joint press release has been issued stating that the case has been settled but that the terms of the settlement are strictly confidential. If a judgment had been reached in this case it would have impacted not only on existing wind farm owners and operators but also on the government’s plans for a number of additional farms to be set up over the next decade.

It remains to be seen whether any further injunction proceedings will be brought against other wind farms in the country by those who are troubled by turbine noise and also as to how the proposed legislation concerning turbine noise disturbance will tackle the issues.

For advice regarding nuisance claims generally, please contact Jennifer Roberts on 02380 482125 or David Eminton on 02380 482284

Adrian Waterton Debut Exhibition

December 16th, 2011 by Paris Smith News

Adrian Waterton is celebrating after the successful launch of his debut exhibition at ArtSway this week. The preview was attended by individuals and businesses from across Southampton and the New Forest and was supported by Paris Smith Solicitors. Peter Taylor who is Head of the Dispute Resolution & Licensing Department said in his address to the audience:
“Outstanding talent and creativity is what will drive regeneration within our economy and Adrian Waterton has that successful combination of ability and vision.”
The chef from Lymington who recovered from life changing injuries after a severe motorbike accident discovered his painting ability when he was recovering and still jokes today that he was given a “blood transfusion from an artist”. He talked to attendees about the journey he goes on when he makes the first imprint on the page, often not knowing or planning how the picture will develop or emerge.  He said
“I get a lot of my ideas from everyday shapes found in objects around the house and develop them into themes such as time and place.”
Other speakers included Peter Jones, Chair of the Board of Trustees for ArtSway who expressed his delight at being able to show such original work but who also talked about the severe challenges that the organization is facing following cuts in funding from various sources including the Arts Council. This has resulted in the loss of two members of staff last month.  Peter Bonnell, ArtSway Curator, was visibly moved when he talked about how this was the last exhibition that he was curating for ArtSway as he too will be leaving at the end of December to take up a post elsewhere.

First Sentence under Bribery Act – follow up to blog dated 6 September 2011

December 14th, 2011 by Sarah Wheadon

Mr Patel, the former Magistrates’ Court clerk convicted of bribery in October has been given a three year prison sentence for the bribery offence. He had also pleaded guilty to misconduct in public office for which he received a six year sentence to run at the same time.

The sentencing judge told Mr Patel that his offences involved a “very substantial breach of trust”. Patel was involved in at least 53 cases where he approached and then assisted offenders to evade fines, penalty points and disqualification in return for payment. Also, between February 2009 and August 2011, he gave people advice about how to avoid being summonsed to court for road traffic offences.

Now is the time for review…

This case shows that the courts will hand out significant sentences for bribery offences; with the six month anniversary of the implementation of the Bribery Act approaching on 1 January 2012, now is the time (if not already done) for businesses to review how their policies and procedures are working.

Mapping Paths to Family Justice

December 5th, 2011 by Rachel Osgood

New research being carried out jointly by the Universities of Exeter and Kent aims to provide detailed insight into the means by which disputes arising from the breakdown of a family relationship are resolved and the positive (or otherwise) effects of those means.

The research will concentrate on 4 main questions:

  1. How widely used is each process, and how embedded has it become in the public mind as a means of resolving family disputes?
  2. How positive or negative have peoples’ experiences of the different processes been in the short and longer term?
  3. What norms of family dispute resolution are embedded in the different alternatives?
  4. Are particular alternatives more or less appropriate for particular kinds of cases of parties?

The research will be split into 3 phases.  The first has already been completed, and involved identifying and interviewing a sample of 3,000 adults representative of the population as a whole in order to assess awareness of the “alternative” forms of dispute resolution and interviewees’ experiences of the different processes.

The second phase will involve interviewing lawyers, mediators, and parties who have experienced family dispute resolution, and will concentrate in greater detail on finding the answers to questions 2 – 4.

Finally, the interviews will be transcribed and analysed, with due consideration given to differences in age, gender, geographical location, socio-economic groups, ethnicity, relationship status etc. 

Findings  from the 3 phases will be synthesised in order to arrive at an overall “map” of experience, and the map will be used to advise and inform lawyers, mediators, policy-makers, legislators and training bodies.

The preliminary findings from the first phase are intriguing.  For example, 20 years after its widespread introduction into family law practice, only 44% of the sample had heard of mediation as a form of dispute resolution.  Compared to that statistic, collaborative law – in its relative infancy and at 14% awareness – doesn’t seem too bad, although it highlights the need for continued effort in this regard.  Depressingly, 45% of the sample had heard of neither mediation, collaborative law nor solicitor-led negotiations.

From the sample, 292 people had experienced divorce since 1996.  Of those, only 7% had been offered collaboration.  The good news for the collaborative movement is that, of the 80% who took up the offer, 66% were either satisfied or very satisfied.  This compares favourably to mediation:  28% were offered mediation, of which 58% took up the offer, but only 41% were satisfied or very satisfied.  It would be interesting to understand the difference between the two levels of satisfaction, but perhaps feelings of control (or lack thereof) might play a significant part in the participants’ experiences.

In any event, there is clearly much to be done in promoting both mediation and collaborative law, and thereafter in ensuring that clients exit the experience more positively.  By way of contrast, solicitor-led negotiation was found to have been offered in 31% of cases, of which 78% had taken up the offer and 65% were either satisfied or very satisfied.  Solicitor-led negotiation is often viewed with scepticism by practitioners who fear spiralling costs, never-ending timescales and inability to reach and/or enforce agreement.  Yet these results show that, not only is it offered more frequently than mediation and collaborative law, satisfaction levels are broadly equivalent to those experienced in collaborative law.

Again, could this be explained by participants feeling that they – with the partisan support of their lawyers – are in control of an otherwise confusing and sometimes frightening experience?

The final results of the project will be disseminated at a conference to be held in 2014.  In the meantime, it is intended that articles and training resources will be developed, and a website is already in the course of construction.

The research is being funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, which is a non-departmental public body funded primarily by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills.  Notwithstanding the eminently sensible reasons behind the research, perhaps the biggest question arising is who is going to pay to implement any policies developed as a result?

If you wish to discuss any of the issues raised in this blog please contact rachel.osgood@parissmith.co.uk

Forfeiture of deposit under an oral contract

December 2nd, 2011 by Mark Withers

It is perhaps a sign of the times that the number of cases coming before the Courts (and commented on in this website)concerning the validity and terms of contracts (particularly where one party is seeking to extract itself) have increased over recent years.

A number of formalities must be satisfied in order for a contract for the sale of land to exist (principally those set out in section 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989). These requirements entail an agreement being in writing and so cannot be satisfied where a verbal agreement is reached for the sale of property notwithstanding the payment of a deposit. 

In circumstances therefore where a buyer pays a deposit to a seller on the basis of a handshake, there cannot be a binding agreement for the sale of an interest in land.  This obviously leaves a question mark over the status of any deposit paid particularly where one of the parties fails to complete.

This situation was considered in the case of Sharma v Simposh Limited.  A prospective buyer paid a deposit amounting in total to £55,000.  A verbal agreement was reached that the vendor would take the first phase of a development off the market and would allow the purchaser to buy that phase for £1,100,000 at any time up until the development was completed.

The purchaser decided not to complete and sought recovery of the deposit paid.

The decision of the Court at first instance (that in the absence of a contract the deposit must be repaid) was appealed.

The Court of Appeal however held that ownership of a deposit could pass even in the absence of a contract where that reflected the party’s intentions (i.e. that the deposit would be forfeited if the buyer didn’t proceed).  In the circumstances, the Court of Appeal concluded that the agreement reached between the parties was that ownership of the deposit had passed to the seller and that it was entitled to retain the deposit following the purchaser’s failure to complete. 

This case emphasises the importance of having, at the very least, a clear (and written) agreement in place for the payment of any deposit in any land transaction.  The absence of such a document will, as happened in the Sharma case, often lead to disputes both as to the basis upon which a deposit was paid and the circumstance in which it might be repayable.

If you wish to discuss any of the issues raised in this blog please contact Mark Withers at mark.withers@parissmith.co.uk.

The perils of trading whilst insolvent – case of Langreen Ltd and the benefit of the doubt

December 2nd, 2011 by Mike Pavitt

On 21 October 2011 Registrar Derrett gave judgment against the liquidator of wireless internet provider Langreen Ltd (currently unreported), finding that the company’s directors were not liable for wrongful trading despite the fact that the company had always been undercapitalised, had always traded at a loss, and had probably always been insolvent on a cashflow basis. She also found that even if they were trading insolvent, the directors had taken every step with a view to minimising the potential loss to creditors of so trading. The company had been placed into liquidation in 2006.

The case itself was very fact specific; amongst the catalysts for liquidation was the failure of the only avaialble satellite provider. The fact that the directors’ judgement in wrongly concluding that the company could trade through its difficulties was not found culpable in this case does not therefore avail other directors in a similar position, save that it will remind those examining such cases of the dangers of assessing directors’ conduct with the benefit of too much hindsight. It all came down to the information which was known or ought to have been known by those directors at that time. However, the judgment does assist by way of a structured analysis of the law and procedural issues.

The case emphasised that in making allegations of wrongful trading, it is incumbent on the liquidator to identify the date upon which he says the company became insolvent (in the application, not just in the evidence). The Registrar also impliedly criticised a perceived approach to wrongful trading cases whereby an insolvency practitioner identifies liquidations with a suitable deficiency in them and instructs a firm of solicitors with whom they enjoy a close relationship to issue proceedings upon substantially all cases reaching a certain threshold without any real analysis or consideration of the strength of the evidence against the directors or whether the claim is legally meritorious.

This was also apparently a case in which the Liquidator had not obtained valid sanction to commence the proceedings (the application not having disclosed that certain directors being pursued were also by far the largest creditors in the liquidation), as required under the Insolvency Act, and where the benefit of the proceedings, if successful, would likely have accrued only to the Liquidator’s costs.

In summary, therefore, whilst the case may be confined to its facts, and whilst it was heard by a Registrar rather than (as is more usually the case for a substantive wrongful trading hearing) a Judge, it serves as a salutary reminder to office holders that they should be working with their solicitors to identify genuinely meritorious cases and exercising caution and open disclosure when applying for sanction to commence such proceedings. Many Liquidators do involve their solicitors in the sanction process, which is both prudent and almost always best practice, not least because the costs of those proceedings will need to be estimated at the time. For directors, the decision is a reminder that just because you may think you are a ‘silent’ director, in the sense that you take no active part in management, you should not assume that a liquidator will look on you as any less suitable a target for litigation.

For more information on wrongful trading, please contact mike.pavitt@parissmith.co.uk

Forfeiture of Deposits

November 28th, 2011 by James Snaith

In the ordinary course of events, a buyer who pays a deposit upon the exchange of contracts will lose that deposit if it fails to proceed to complete.

It is however possible for a Court Order to be obtained requiring the seller to return the deposit to the buyer even where the buyer has failed to observe its contractual obligations (and has failed to complete).

The discretion of the Court has in the past, been exercised where a deposit was considered to be excessively high (see the case of Workers Trust v Dojap Investments Limited).  There is also statutory provision (Section 49 of the Law of Property Act 1925) which provides that the Court may order the refund of a deposit where it considers it appropriate.

The recent case of Amble Assets v Long Benton Foods concerned an application for repayment of a deposit (which in this instance concerned a company sale and amounted to 10% of the value of the property and 50% of the value of the processing equipment used in the business).  The court didn’t actually rule on the reasonableness of the deposit but appeared to take the view that it was reasonable given the commercial risk involved in the transaction.  This appears to reflect the fact that Courts take the view that the question of a deposit’s reasonableness won’t depend upon whether it reflects potential loss but rather whether it is reasonable in the circumstances of the transaction as a whole.

Whilst the Amble Assets case suggests the usual rule of thumb (that a 10% deposit is reasonable) may be displaced comparatively easily, it nonetheless  emphasises the risks which a party takes in entering into a transaction on the basis of receipt of a deposit in excess of 10% of the purchase price.  In so doing there is a very real prospect that a court may order the return of the deposit even where the party who has paid the deposit defaults in respect of its other contractual obligations.

If you wish to discuss any of the issues raised in this blog, please contact James Snaith at james.snaith@parissmith.co.uk.

 

Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd and another (Revenue and Customs Comrs and other intervening) [2011] UK SC 38

November 23rd, 2011 by James McNeil

The Supreme Court has given a further indication that the courts really do not want to intervene in cases involving complex financial instruments and are now seeking to emphasize party autonomy.

This case involved a complex credit swap transaction.  Investors’ money was used to acquire assets which were then charged in favour of a security trustee.  The “waterfall” provisions of the charge (which set out the priority of payment of enforcement proceeds) stated that the counterparty to the swap (a Lehman Brothers spv); was to be paid in priority to the noteholders, unless an event of default occurred.  If an event of default did occur the priority was to be “flipped”, so that the noteholders were to be paid in priority to the counterparty.  An event of default included the insolvency of the counterparty to the swap.  Unfortunately, this then occurred due to Lehman Brothers entering into Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in September 2008.  The counterparty argued before the Court that the “flip” clause infringed the anti-deprivation rule.  This is a common law rule which states that parties cannot contract out of insolvency legislation by attempting to withdraw an asset from an insolvent estate which would otherwise be available for distribution to the creditors of that estate.

However, the Supreme Court has ruled that the anti-deprivation principle should not be extended to strike down complex commercial transactions entered into in good faith where there is no intention to evade insolvency law.  The judgment has also clarified the operation of the anti-deprivation principle in commercial transactions following the decision of the House of Lords in British Eagle International Airlines Ltd v CIE Nationale Air France [1075] 1 WLR 758 which had caused confusion between the anti-deprivation principle and the pari passu principle (which prevents parties contracting to give a creditor more than a pro-rata distribution on insolvency).

Comment

The courts do seem to be stepping back from previous interventionist stances and are now leaving it up to well advised commercial parties to negotiate and agree their own positions.  If an insolvent company loses an asset as a result of documentation drafted in good faith and for commercial reasons, the Supreme Court does not believe the courts should intervene to alter an agreed position provided that there is no intention to evade insolvency law.

In theory the decision could have wide ranging consequences, certainly not confined to financial instruments, as the anti-deprivation principle applies to all forms of assets from claims to real property.  The UK Supreme Court has been sitting only since October 2009, but it is already making its weight felt in the commercial arena, and read alongside other recent Supreme Court decisions such as Rainy Sky SA (see our blog of 21 November 2011),  Belmont Park certainly helps to strike a blow for business common sense.

Whether this decision leads to renewed attempts by parties to push the boundaries of contracting out of the consequences of insolvency is less certain.  It is worth noting that the judgment in this case does not state that good faith and commercial justification will be good defences on all occasions, nor does it set out clear principles of law which can be applied definitively in all circumstances.

In short, watch this space for further developments!

For more information on this topic please contact James McNeil or Mike Pavitt